Do the Giants have the best top of the rotation in baseball this year?

MadBum, Johnny Beisbol, and The Shark In The House
by Jim Silva

    This was the off-season of free agent starting pitchers and the Giants jumped into the pool with their clothes on and their iPhone in their pocket. They signed not one, but two high-priced veteran arms to take the #2 and #3 spots in their rotation spending $130 million to ink Johnny Cueto for 6 years and another $90 million to tie up Jeff Samardzija through the 2020 season. Did they spend their money wisely or will Brian Sabean regret this off-season for committing so much of their resource pool to two guys who have better reputations than skill sets?
    Here is how the off-season starting pitcher market turned out. Listed below are the top ten starting pitchers, ordered by average salary, who signed free agent deals this off-season.
(data for salaries taken from spotrac.com)

Name
Age
Signing Team
Length of Deal
In Years
Total Dollars
Average Salary
David Price
30
Boston
7
217,000,000
31,000,000
Zack Greinke
32
Arizona
6
206,500,000
34,416,667
Johnny Cueto
30
San Francisco
6
130,000,000
21,666,667
Jordan Zimmerman
29
Detroit
5
110,000,000
22,000,000
Jeff Samardzija
31
San Francisco
5
90,000,000
18,000,000
Wei-Yen Chen
30
Miami
5
80,000,000
16,000,000
Mike Leake
28
St. Louis
5
80,000,000
16,000,000
Scott Kazmir
32
Los Angeles
3
48,000,000
16,000,000
Ian Kennedy
31
Kansas City
5
70,000,000
14,000,000
J.A. Happ
33
Toronto
3
36,000,000
12,000,000

A couple things stand out from a quick glance at this table. First of all nobody, other than the Giants, signed two of the top ten pitchers on the list. Also note that the two guys at the top of the list are making substantially more a year than the rest of the guys on the list who are mainly clustered around a median of $16 million a year. Does this mean that they are the two most valuable starters who were on the market this year? Let’s look at the table in a different way.

Name
Mean Innings Pitched 2013-2015
Mean WAR 2013-2015
Projected Innings
Zack Greinke
201
5.83
191.0
David Price
218
4.46
195.0
Jordan Zimmerman
205
4.03
181.0
Johnny Cueto
172
3.90
190.0
Mike Leake
200
2.47
177.0
Wei-Yen Chen
171
2.47
174.0
Scott Kazmir
177
2.03
170.0
Jeff Samardzija
216
1.63
189.0
J.A. Happ
141
1.50
160.0
Ian Kennedy
184
-0.17
164.0
If you order the table to reflect accumulated WAR (Wins Above Replacement) for each of the pitchers, then we see the order shift a bit with Greinke moving to the top, and Cueto and Samardzija dropping a spot or three. Greinke is clearly the best of the pitchers in this chart and Kennedy is a huge gamble, but in between there is a lot of variation from guys who regularly pitch a lot of innings – like Mike Leake, to guys who provide quality, but not necessarily innings – like Happ. Interestingly, Samardzija is the 5th highest paid, but in terms of WAR earned per season, he is third from the bottom.
    So what do you get when you buy the services of The Shark? You get durability for sure. His average of 216 innings pitched per season for the last three campaigns is quite a feat when teams like the Rockies didn’t have even a single pitcher break the 150 innings mark last season.  2014 was Samardzija’s best season and 2015 was easily his worst since he became a rotation regular. Obviously the White Sox traded for Samardzija hoping he would be the pitcher he was in 2014 and his 4.99 ERA was not what they thought would happen. Now the Giants are paying Samardzija to figure out what went wrong in Chicago and find his way back to the guy who in 2014 threw 219.67 innings, striking out 202 and walking a paltry 43 batters. His ERA of 2.99 and WHIP of 1.065 were the sort of numbers aces sport. Samardzija’s 2014 was a real representation of his growth as a starting pitcher. He still threw fastballs in the mid 90’s, but he showed real improvement in his control and kept the ball in the park as his home run rate dropped to 0.8 – the first season he managed a sub-1.0 home run per nine rate since he’d become a full-time starter. Shark’s projections have his control numbers staying steady, but his innings pitched and strike outs dropping off significantly. It is unlikely that the Giants will decrease his workload, which means that the Giants will probably get 200+ innings from the first three spots in their rotation (including Samardzija’s). With his improved control and no health issues, Samardzija will beat his projections throwing half his games in a pitcher’s park. 200+ quality innings will make The Shark a good sign and possibly a bargain.
    Johnny Cueto is a five-pitch pitcher who relies most heavily on his fastball which he throws in the low to mid-90’s and uses about half the time, a cutter he uses about 20% of the time, and a change that he surprises the hitter with around 15% of the time. He is an ace for most teams in baseball, and was highly coveted last season when he was with the Reds. His time in Kansas City was not what anyone expected and it hurt his market value in free agency. There were rumors about him being injured, but anyone who watched him pitch the second game of the World Series and throw a 122 pitch complete game where he only allowed two hits would have a hard time explaining what kind of injury allows that kind of performance. Cueto was not as sharp or consistent with KC as he had been before the trade but assuming the Giants did their due diligence before signing him, then they should be getting a guy who throws a lot of innings – 243.67 in 2014 – with his 3 year average in the table suffering from his DL stint due to a lat strain in 2013. He suppresses home runs reasonably well (home run per nine rates under 1.0 each year but one since 2010), with great peripherals (strikeout to walk ratios over 3.7 each of the last two seasons). In short, he is a beast and the Giants took advantage of the rumors about his health to sign him for less than he would have otherwise been offered.
    One odd statistical bump could account for Cueto’s less than ace-like performance in his short time in KC. His BABIP (batting average on balls that hitters put into play) was freakishly (for him) high. Cueto’s BABIP was .343 in his 13 starts for the Royals although it has never been above .298 during any other season. His 2015 BABIP before the trade was .234 by comparison. There may have been something going on hampering Cueto from making the adjustment to the American League, but more than anything he was just plain unlucky.
    You know it is going to be an interesting season for your team when we haven’t even talked about the ace of the pitching staff and the two guys we have talked about are costing $19.8 million this season alone. Madison Bumgarner is the undisputed ace of the Giants based on his post-season heroics more than anything else. What he did in the 2014 playoffs and World Series will never be forgotten by Giants fans. But his regular season portfolio is a pretty glorious sight as well and it just keeps getting better. Best yet, Mad Bum is only 26. It seems like he should be older because he made 18 starts as a 20 year old and has made no fewer than 31 starts every year since he start drinking legally – that’s five seasons in a row. Over that time period he has pitched at least 201 innings, seen his WHIP drop each season from 1.212 in 2011 to 1.008 last season. Each of the last two seasons his strikeout-to-walk ratio has increased from 3.21 to 5.09 to 6.00 last season. His strikeouts per nine have also climbed from 8.3 in 2012 to 9.6 last season. Bumgarner has also kept his home runs per nine under 1.00 each of the last three seasons. Yeah – basically he is great and still improving. So when will the upward growth stop? Hard to know. 26 is still young for a starting pitcher. That could mean that he will keep getting better for a few years or it might mean that he is going to start declining earlier because of all the mileage on his arm at a young age. The cherry on top is that Madison can swing the bat. He has two seasons in a row with an OPS above .740 smacking 9 home runs over the last two seasons in 159 plate appearances. Wait! Here’s something bad! He had an awful spring training. Not that it counts or matters as he still maintained good peripherals, except for the home runs allowed per nine innings pitched. Nothing to see here folks – move along.
    Let’s stop for a moment. There has been a lot of talk this off-season about who has the best starting rotation in baseball. The Diamondbacks made moves to bolster their rotation and have received a lot of love from the baseball world for their top three. The Mets have the young guns and the depth. The Rays seem to always have rotation depth and some stud like Chris Archer pitching the opener. If the Mets are everybody’s gold standard of what a starting rotation should look like, let’s remember than not one of the top three hurlers in their rotation hit the 200 innings pitched mark, unlike each of the top three starters in the Giants rotation. I know there were reasons that the Mets pitchers needed to be protected a bit, but that is a factor when assessing a rotation too, or at least it should be. When the Mets top three can surpass 600 innings, assuming they can do it while maintaining their same high standards that they set last season, then perhaps they can lay claim to the title. But until they have actually done it and we aren’t just talking about their potential and one great season, then San Francisco’s top three (here it comes) is the best trio at the top of any rotation in baseball.
    Sadly, nobody pitches 400 innings anymore (Where is Addie Joss when you need him?), so most teams need to employ a fourth, fifth, and sometimes a sixth starter. Like almost every team in baseball there is quite a drop off from the 3rd man in the rotation to the 4th. Jake Peavy averaged just under six innings per start in 2015 (5.8) with a fastball that averaged 89 MPH. The 34 year old Cy Young Award winner (2007) who used to strike out a ton of batters is no longer that guy. He has kept his strikeout-to-walk rate in the threes by reducing his walk rate as his strikeout rate dropped – a heady trick. He still punches out 6.3 batters over nine, but he also gives up a lot of fly balls, so it’s good that he pitches in San Francisco. His home run rate more than doubles when he leaves the Bay Area to pitch but overall was 1.0 per nine innings last season. His ERA+ (ERA adjusted to his park and relative to the rest of the league was 105 – slightly better than league average, and his FIP (ERA based only on what the pitcher controls) was 3.87, slightly worse than his ERA of 3.58. Manager Bruce Bochy has announced that he was not going to push Peavy as deep into starts in 2016 as he has in the past based on his stats that show his ERA in the 6th inning is 7.71 which is good compared to his ERA of 15.75 in the 7th inning. Peavy gets by with deception nowadays and becomes less David Copperfield-esque the third time hitters see him in a game. Having guys throw over 200 innings in the first, second, and third spots in the rotation saves the bullpen so that when Peavy, occupying the fourth spot comes along they can pitch a couple more innings of relief. Not only did their free agent signings make the top of the rotation better, they should also make Peavy more effective because he gets to hand the ball over to the pen before blowing up.
    What the hell is wrong with Matt Cain? Homey was a beast through 2012 picking up Cy Young votes three years in a row and hitting the 200 innings mark in six straight seasons through 2012. He has been nicked up for a while now which might explain the ugly trends in his numbers. While his strikeouts-to-walk ratios have remained above two (just barely last year at 2.05), Cain’s hits-per-nine ratio, WHIP, hits-per-nine, and home runs per nine have increased each season since 2012. The annual watch for the return of the prodigal pitcher must be getting old for Giants fans by now. Even the Baseball Prospectus projections are believers in Matty.  IF he is healthy, and IF he can return even halfway to his old form, then the Giants are going to have a really fun season. His last spring outing was solid and he lasted into the 6th so maybe Cain is no longer an ace, but an innings eater – and that would be just fine on this staff this year because they already have three aces. Peavy and Cain just need to get out there every fifth day and last into the 5th or 6th inning so they don’t burn through the pen.
    Waiting in the pen for godawful things to happen to the other starters will be Chris Heston. Heston’s rookie year in the bigs last season was, um, interesting. The 6’3” righty threw a no-hitter after joining the rotation. Heston wasn’t expected to be lights out, but he was for the first half of the season. Here is a wee table to show how he threw a rod in the second half last year, and if you look not too closely, you might also see why.

Starts
Innings Pitched
Walks/9
Home Runs/9
WHIP
ERA
First Half
18
111.67
2.4
0.48
1.200
3.39
Second Half
13
66
4.6
1.36
1.500
4.91
   
Heston’s control went the way of the Dodo with his walk rate almost doubling, leading to more home runs and more home runs with men on base, which of course means an ERA a run and a half higher. Aside from the second half of last year and 19 starts at triple-A Fresno in 2013, Heston’s control hasn’t been a huge problem. His minor league walk rate was mostly in the 2.0 to 2.7 per nine range. And aside from that tough 2013, Heston has limited home runs to below 1.0 per nine innings – his career rate is around 0.7 including both big league and minor league numbers. This spring was rocky for Heston, but his strikeout rate was up and his walk rate was down so… Heston’s game isn’t about strikeouts, it’s about inviting batters to ground out and keeping the ball on this, the grassy side of the fence. If he joins the rotation at some point and makes 20+ starts, he should be able to reproduce his overall numbers from last season or even best them unless his control again eludes him.
    Both Cueto and Samardzija should produce strong performances this year pitching in AT&T park backed by a good defensive team that will score runs for them. The Giants rotation additions will be a stabilizing force on the entire pitching staff allowing the bullpen to be fresh for the post-season. Brian Sabean and crew did a smart thing jumping in on Cueto and Samardzija when they were in “buy low” positions. The quality innings they contribute just might be the driving force that pushes the Giants to the top of the division and, with some luck, far into the post-season.

The Giants outfield looks to improve upon 2015.

Hunter Back On The Prowl
by Jim Silva

    For many teams, the outfield is where a lot of the fireworks are generated on offense and often where the stars play – not so for the Giants. Other than Hunter Pence, the Giants have filled in with players who are solid but not stars of the same quality as their infielders. That’s not to say that the outfield is bad, just that you aren’t looking at Mays or Bonds out there.
    Hunter Pence is the “Ace” of the Giants outfield. In this, his 4th season with the Giants, Pence is second to perhaps only Buster Posey as the face of the team. The quirky right-fielder had two excellent seasons for the Giants before being derailed by injuries last year, managing only a half season. Pence is usually good for 20+ home runs, 50+ walks, and an OPS north of .800. You could have penciled him in for 150+ games until last season as he had met that mark every year since 2008. At 32, the hope is that Pence can hold onto some of that reliability for a few more seasons. He is lean and athletic so he is more likely to regain health than other players who are, shall we say, less wiry. Pence is 6’4 220 and built like a thin question mark. He doesn’t look like a guy who would have 194 career home runs in 9 seasons. The guy is all fast twitch and he looks wrong doing everything – but it works.  His career .284/.327/.478 slash line is about what teams expect of him each year. He isn’t going to drill 40 homers or bat .330, but you know what you’re going to get out of him year in and year out.
    Pence is slightly below average with the glove based on comprehensive defensive metrics, although his reputation is better that his stats. He has posted negative DRS (defensive runs saved) numbers three out the last four years (last year he broke even), although his range factor has been around league average or above in each of the last three campaigns. Like his swing, he looks a mess in the outfield even though he gets the job done.
    The 2012 trade to acquire Pence looks like an incredibly one-sided deal, mainly because it is. None of the three players (Nate Schierholtz, Tommy Joseph, and Seth Rosin) the Phillies acquired in the deal are likely to do anything this season, or really much of anything at the major league level in the future. Scheirholtz hit some home runs for the Cubs and put up 1.5 WAR – his only season with a WAR above 1.0. – in 2013 (after the Cubs signed him away from Philadelphia), but is unlikely to see action in the majors again except as an emergency call up. The full picture with Pence is that he hits for average and power, runs the bases well, plays a pretty clean right field, is a blast to watch – even in the on-deck circle – and is a fan and teammate favorite. If he has fully recovered from his injury-laden 2015, he will garner some MVP votes and be in contention for the All Star team putting up nearly 4.0 WAR seasons.
    The Giants have been hoping that Angel Pagan would be the starting center-fielder who saved the Mets 19 runs in 2010 while contributing 5.3 WAR. Pagan has contributed to the team since then, but not with his glove. The now 34 year old Pagan has cost the Giants runs with his glove every year since they acquired him in 2012 culminating in a DRS last season of -20 runs. Pagan has battled injuries for years and they appear to be winning based on his declining numbers last season. 2015 was the first season where Pagan failed to post an OPS+ (on-base plus slugging relative to the rest of the league) above 100 falling all the way to 77. He has battled injuries his entire career, but now that he has had a bulging disc and spinal stenosis, you have to wonder if he can be the guy who finished first in the league in range for center fielders in 2010 and 2012, or even the guy who slugged over .400. His career average slugging percentage is .406 but he dropped to .389 in 2014, and .332 in 2015. He moves to left field where his glove will be under less pressure – his body too probably, but his bat will have to produce like it’s 2013. Otherwise he will be pushed to the side by younger, healthier players with power as soon as this year.
    Undoubtedly, Pagan’s precipitous decline was the main reason the Giants went out and signed Denard Span. To get Span, the Giants had to commit to him for three years (plus a mutual option for a fourth), which is a risk since Span is 32 and battled injuries himself last season. When healthy, Span contributes great range in center, speed on the bases, and excellent command of the strike zone. His career .352 on base percentage and .76 walks per strikeout make him a difficult guy to erase cleanly. Span has contributed with the glove as his stats show, although last season, plagued by injuries, he cost the Nationals 10 runs according to DRS in spite of his range, which at 2.62 was still above league average (2.41) for center fielders. Span’s best season with the glove was 2012 when he saved the Twins 19 runs and put up 5.0 WAR. His best season with the bat was 2014 – his last full season with the Nationals – where he put up 4.2 offensive WAR. Span will be a solid leadoff hitter and will likely track down a lot more balls than Pagan, but the contract he signed might turn into a weight around the Giants’ neck if injuries start to steal away his speed on the bases and cut his elite range down to where he turns into Angel Pagan.
    Left field is usually where you stick your big slow guy who pounds the ball over the fence – think Dave Kingman or Pete Incaviglia here. With Pagan out there, there is lots of room for the 4th and 5th outfielders to get playing time. Gregor Blanco has been in the outfield picture for the Giants for four seasons and until 2015 appeared in 140+ games each season. 2015 saw Blanco’s playing time diminish even though he posted career-best offensive numbers for a full season. His .291/.368/413 slash line was the basis for his 1.1 WAR season. Blanco’s glove is about average like the rest of his game. He is an excellent 4th outfielder who can play all three outfield spots without killing the team and can get on base, but he is not a starting outfielder for a championship team. The amount of playing time he has garnered with the Giants shows you how much they rely on their infield for production. There is nothing wrong with that kind of team construction, but if the Giants give Blanco 450 or more plate appearances, they will be hurting their chances to have that weird even-season World Series mojo work out. This isn’t a condemnation of Blanco, but having two guys like Blanco essentially starting for you in the outfield means that you are probably leaving something on the table. So what else do the Giants have in their outfield cupboard?
    Mac Williamson had a hot spring with a .310/.396/.667 slash line. That .667 slugging percentage comes via three doubles and four home runs in 48 plate appearances, and the three walks help the on-base percentage. Williamson’s minor league history shows him to have a good hit tool and some power – mostly doubles to go along with 15ish home run power. He cranked 25 jacks in 2013 in San Jose, but that’s the Cal League where even baby chinchillas hit double digit dongs. In his brief exposure to the majors he struck out almost 24% of the time, up from his minor league career rate of 20%. His minor league numbers (.291/.376/.486 slash line) say he is close to being ready even with a lower batting average of .249 in triple-A. His Arizona Fall League numbers and his spring numbers indicate that he might be ready to break out. He crushed AFL pitching to the tune of a .370/.442/.493 slash line, so Pagan and Blanco should be looking over their shoulders at the 6’4”, 240 pound youngster in the rear view mirror.
    Jarrett Parker had a hell of an introduction to the big leagues in 2015 where he made the most of his 54 plate appearances, clubbing six home runs and hitting .347 with a .755 slugging percentage. Nobody, not even Mama or Papa Parker, believes that Parker can reproduce his numbers anywhere ever again, but his minor league numbers show him to be a patient hitter with real power. The main problem is that it took him so long to reach the majors – he is 27 – and is no longer really a prospect. It also seems like the book is out on him with pitchers striking him out in a third of his 60 plate appearances during his spring training battle with Mac Williamson. In his first full season at triple-A last year he put up nice numbers including a .283/.375/.514 slash line, 51 extra base hits (including 25 home runs), and 62 walks to somewhat offset his horrific 164 strikeouts. Striking out almost 33% last year in triple-A is slightly above his career minor league strikeout rate of 30% and neither are pretty.
    Even though Parker has the better tasting cup of coffee stats, Williamson should beat him out eventually and then compete for the starting job in one of the corners. The Giants outfield is old so there should be plenty of chances to play, even as the 5th outfielder. Williamson supposedly has the glove, arm, and range to be an asset, so if he can hit a little he’ll get plenty of chances to show why he is the third best outfielder in San Francisco right now.

The 2016 San Francisco Giants – a team with an offense and defense driven by their sneaky-great infield.

Scrapping In The Red Dirt
by Jim Silva

    Most teams have a question at some position on the infield, some battle to be resolved during spring training. But looking at the Giants team that finished 2nd in the NL West you’d need a crowbar to get yourself in as a regular on the infield.  Here is a list of awards garnered by the Giants infield last season: runner up for Rookie of the Year, Silver Slugger, Gold Glove, All-Star Game starter (times two). It’s no wonder the Giants infield did so well in the post-season awards bonanza. The four regulars who played at an average age of 25.75 years old last season, average 4.25 WAR and most incredibly saved 42 runs according to DRS – that’s an average of 10.5 runs per position. That’s the kind of infield you marry after the first date! And that’s without including their God-like catcher, Buster Posey – add him in and it just gets even more stupid! It was a really boring spring training for Giants’ fans who like good positional battles, unless you get excited about a nice little utility infielder battle. The infield is certainly a good reason for Giants fans to get a little wiggle in their walk for 2016.
    Brandon Crawford has been a favorite with the ladies for a few years now, but became a favorite with the Giants and baseball fans in general in 2015, his breakout season. The 2008 4th round pick has been an established glove man at short for four full seasons now and there were flashes of goodness from his bat like 10 triples and 59 walks in 2014. Last year Crawford took a big step toward stardom. BCraw’s best home run total had been the 10 he hit in 2014, but last season he cranked 21 long balls, nearly matching his total output from the previous three seasons. His doubles total also jumped from a high of 26 in 2012 to 33 last season, which combined with his added ten points above his career batting average and the spike in jacks contributed to his career best .462 slugging percentage – that’s 79 points over his career number. Not only did he have his best season with the stick, he flashed some pretty absurd leather winning the Gold Glove in the process. According to DRS (defensive runs saved) he saved the Giants 20 runs while putting up a dWAR (defensive wins above replacement) of 2.9. Add it all up and Crawford led all shortstops in 2015 with a 5.6 WAR season.   Although regression to the mean is a real thing, Crawford is a legitimate stud to build an infield around – the Giants recognized this by handing him $75 million to play for them through the 2021 season.
    Crawford’s double play partner was Joe Panik – has Chris Berman bestowed a nickname upon young Joe yet? Are there Panik buttons for Giants’ fans to hit when he steps into the box? Panik is not a full fledged star just yet, but he is a useful piece to have in your infield and in your lineup. He is likely to have a decent career as a starter for a few years before someone far more interesting comes along. That is not a knock on Panik. Not everyone can be Buster Posey or Hunter Pence – two interesting fellows and teammates of Joe’s. Panik is likely to smack 20+ doubles and come close to 10 home runs while playing league-average defense. That’s what he did last season, and that was an improvement on his rookie season – no falling to the sophomore jinx for the pride of Hopewell Junction, NY! Panik never incited excitement during his climb through the minors after being selected in the 1st round of the 2011 draft. The best things about his game are his hit tool – .312 batting average – his ability to make contact – only 42 strikeouts in 2015, and his clean glove work – only 2 errors for a .996 fielding percentage last year. His slash line of .312/.378/.455 fits nicely as the prototypical two hitter, which is where the Giants used him from May 2nd on. That kind of production isn’t sexy in the Barry Bonds sense of the word – he only hit eight homers and stole three bases – but make no mistake, Panik deserved his spot on the All-Star team for his excellent, consistent, extremely valuable table-setting work. There aren’t many teams on the planet that would turn his kind of production down – sexy or not.
    The Giants corners started last season as areas of concern, but both gelled by season’s end into true assets. At first base, Brandon Belt had a 2014 he probably would like to forget after forging a slash line of .243/.306/.449 and ending the season early after thumb surgery followed by a concussion with lingering symptoms. Last season couldn’t have been more different as Belt turned into a middle of the order stalwart. His 2015 season actually looked almost identical to his breakout season of 2013. He isn’t a classic masher but still managed a .478 slugging percentage due to the 33 doubles he added to his 18 home runs. He gets on base – last year his .280 average and 56 walks combined for a .356 on-base percentage. He even managed to steal a career high nine bags while only being nabbed three times. His glove work was also a significant contribution as he finished 5th among all first basemen with 8 runs saved according to DRS. Like almost everyone who plays infield for the Giants, he isn’t a guy who makes you want to buy a fathead for your living room, but he contributes in enough ways to make you think about voting for him for the All-Star squad without totally feeling like a homer.
    The guy throwing bullets to Belt from the opposite corner is Matt Duffy – no not the one who plays for the Astros. This Matt Duffy was a scrawny 18th round pick in 2012 – a slick-fielding shortstop who hit like your grandma AFTER the hip replacement. Well, whatever Kool-aid homeboy drank, send some our way because he broke out last season like nobody’s business and had a legit All-Star season. Nobody was surprised (except everybody) that he would take to third base so well, saving the Giants 12 runs for 4th best in the majors behind some dudes you’ve probably heard of: Nolan Arenado (18), Adrian Beltre (18), and Manny Machado (14). To get himself to that level in one season at the position makes you wonder what he might do when he actually gets comfortable over there! His bat made him look like a young up and coming third baseman too. Duffy drilled 28 doubles and 12 home runs while maintaining a high batting average to finish with a nifty .295/.334/.428 slash line. Looking at his .336 BABIP (batting average on balls he puts into play) shows it to be in line with his career numbers, so it is reasonable to expect some growth, as opposed to regression. Duffy’s home run numbers might be the only aberration as his total of 12 long balls last year fell just one short of his minor league career total (from three seasons) of 13. While it is possible that he developed real power, it is hard to see his 170 pound frame as that of a legit slugger. His 12 steals in 12 attempts does look real as Duffy has always been a high percentage base stealer. Getting a WAR of 4.9 out of the blue is quite the gift so Matt Duffy is kind of like the Giants’ Santa who took over for the Kung Fu Panda.
    Oh yeah, that exciting battle for the utility spot? It is likely to boil down to a choice between Kelby Tomlinson (the favorite coming into camp), Hak-Ju Lee, and Ehire Adrianza. Tomlinson has played more second than shortstop in the majors, but put up a 1.0 WAR season last year for the Giants in only 193 plate appearances. Most of Tomlinson’s value was in his bat last year – he profiles a lot like Panik or a powerless version of Duffy, with his batting average and speed being his best skills. A .303/.358/.404 slash line from your utility infielder is nothing to sneeze at. Adrianza has been the nifty glove man who has played all the infield spots except catcher in his time with the Giants. Only 25 last year, his only offensive value came from the 15 walks he drew in 134 plate appearances. His career slash line of .211/.290/.294 in 260 plate appearances over three seasons is pretty much what the Giants can expect. His minor league numbers are better, but not that much better. He has been a decent base stealer in the minors, but that skill hasn’t translated to the majors. To make him worth keeping, his defense has to be special, and while it is good, he is likely to get bumped by almost anyone with a good glove because his bat is so atrocious.
    The last guy in this most exciting of races is Hak-Ju Lee. Lee is fast and a good fielder, but his bat has looked pretty weak and full of holes the last couple of seasons at AAA. He is only in the conversation because of a decent spring where he posted a .286/.375/.286 slash line. He is a high percentage base-stealer and is an actual shortstop. He has barely played second base so that could hurt him, but not if the Giants believe that he can get on base and use his mad base-stealing skills.
    Tomlinson and Adrianza made the big club out of spring training, but Lee is tearing it up at triple-A, so if either of the two major leaguers slip, Lee is making a strong case to take the middle infield backup job. It’s a nice problem to have and only underscores the Giants depth.
    San Francisco’s infield is loaded for bear this year. Even with a little regression, they are going to be tough because they can field and hit with the best of them. If they are not the best infield in all of baseball then they are certainly one of the best. Look for the black and orange pitching staff to benefit from the slick glove work on the infield as well as the run scoring ability.

How do you take care of a Hall of Fame catcher? Ask the Giants.

Pose(y) Colored Glasses
by Jim Silva

    Has there been a golden age of catching – a time when great catchers were falling from the sky and bumping into each other on the bus? It is such a difficult position to fill at the major league level that having one man who has mastered catching and can also hit is like finding candy that is actually good for you. The ‘70s produced a lot of great catchers – Johnny Bench, Carlton Fisk, and Gary Carter all played at the same time in the mid-70’s and all three are in the Hall of Fame. But from sheer volume, the true Golden Age of Catching was during the 1930s when Ernie Lombardi, Bill Dickey, Mickey Cochrane, Rick Ferrell, and Gabby Hartnett wore the tools of ignorance – and those were just the Hall of Fame members! There are only 18 catchers in the Hall, so to have 27% of them playing at the same time is uncanny, even if you take into account that players from the ‘20s and the ‘30s are vastly overrepresented in the Hall.
    Part of the blame for the dearth of catchers in the Hall Of Fame falls on the perceived value of defense, and that is at least partially the fault of the lack of an easy way to measure defensive value. Even now with the availability of mountains of statistics that are readily available, there isn’t consensus on how to measure defense – especially from catchers. Sure, there is some disagreement over offensive measures, but by comparison the fight over defensive stats makes the disagreement about offensive stats look like a hug festival! And since catcher has been a defense first position maybe forever, it might at least partially explain why there are so few catchers in The Hall.
    One thing that IS certain is that this is not the golden age of catching, so catchers like Yadier Molina and the Giants catcher, Buster Posey, stand out. They are likely the only two catchers currently in the majors, with a reasonable chance of making the Hall of Fame. Posey has an edge on Molina because his bat is excellent. Molina has been the gold standard for defense for years, but Posey is no slouch.
    In 2015, Gerald (yep, that’s Buster’s real first name), completed his 4th straight season playing at least 147 games. In each of those seasons he caught at least 100 games, spending part of his time at 1st base or in the DH spot during inter-league games. Catching is incredibly taxing and the Giants have done a good job of getting Posey out from behind the plate to protect him, which will hopefully prolong his career. By contrast, Molina has caught at least 130 games each season since 2009, except for his 2014 season when he missed significant time to a thumb injury.  Molina is older than Posey, but they are interesting to compare because they are the two top catchers in the game, and their usage is so different.  Molina is almost exactly five years older than Posey, and has caught 1436 games in the majors to Posey’s 576. That is a significant amount of wear and tear.
    Molina has always been better known for his glove than his bat although he can hit some – maybe not like Posey – but he definitely adds value to the team with his bat. From 2011 through 2013 Yadier racked up 12.6 points of oWAR (a comprehensive measure of offense relative to a replacement level player). 2014 and 2015 were a disappointment for Molina on offense, but he still contributed 2.1 oWAR even though his power numbers dipped. When you have a glove man like Molina and you aren’t as worried about his bat carrying the team, do you play him at his most valuable position or do you try to make sure you protect his bat? Here you have the tale of two catchers. The Giants have protected Posey because his bat is arguably the best bat in their lineup and his catching skills are gravy. The Cardinals have played Molina into the ground because his bat is gravy, but his glove is perceived as game-changing.
    To put Posey’s young career into perspective, his career slash line through May 1st, 2016 was .310/.374/.483. He has accumulated 27.2 oWar which is already more oWAR than Hall Of Fame catcher Ray Schalk accumulated in his entire 18 season career (23.7). After only two full seasons in the majors, Posey had won the Rookie of The Year Award, a Silver Slugger, and the NL MVP. To date he has won a total of three Silver Slugger Awards, received MVP votes in each of his full seasons (winning in 2012) and appeared on three All Star teams. And you know that magical even-year thang the Giants have goin’ on? Well, Posey’s top three slugging years happen to be 2010, 2012, and 2014 – as Posey’s bat goes, so go the Giants?
    As for Posey’s work behind the plate, Buster has averaged 12 DRS (defensive runs saved) for the last six seasons, and in 2015 won the Fielding Bible Award as the best defensive catcher in all of baseball with 17 runs saved. Posey’s throwing is good – he nailed 36% of the runners foolish enough to attempt to steal on him last season and has already caught 44% this season to add to his career 33% caught stealing rate – but his framing is unearthly. Mr. and Mrs. Posey’s son has saved 19.4, 23.6, and 12.7 runs with his framing skills in each of the last three seasons alone. Enough said.
    The last couple of seasons, the Giants have had the luxury of having a backup catcher in Andrew Susac who would likely start for many teams in baseball. Susac has some home run power and has historically been a good pitch framer with at least an average arm. In 2013 and 2014 he saved 7.3 and 13.3 runs with his framing skills at triple-A and has maintained a 35% caught stealing rate during his minor league career. He also has 34 homers (in a season and a half worth of at bats) and a slash line of .255/.363/.427 – again – these are minor league career numbers. If stats from the minors always carried over to the majors then predicting what prospects will do would be easy – which it clearly is not. Still, Susac only has 221 big league at bats and his numbers aren’t too far off from his minor league stats. He won’t hit for average, but with a full-time gig you could expect 10-15 home runs and an on-base percentage north of .320. Who wouldn’t want that from their strong armed, pitch framing catcher?
    Last season Susac was a hot mess, putting up sub-par framing numbers and hitting only .218 with a .368 slugging percentage. His walk numbers kept his offensive value barely in the positive, but he will be caught and passed by other prospects unless he can adjust to playing infrequently – or the Giants decide to play Posey at first more often, or even exclusively, in order to maximize his offense allowing Susac to play regularly and develop.
    The other guy trying to make the roster out of spring training is Trevor Brown. The 10th round pick got his cup of coffee at the end of last season when the games didn’t count – well, they didn’t count for the Giants who were out of the race by then. Brown actually hit a bit better than you’d expect him to hit based on his minor league career slash line of .244/.300/.316. In only 39 at bats he hit three doubles but sculpted a limp .231/.279/.308 line. On the defensive side of the plate, Brown has a minor league career rate of nailing 30% of base thieves. During his call up 7 of 9 runners stole on him for a 22% caught stealing rate – a small sample size that left him below the league average. He had a great year at triple-A in terms of pitch framing saving his club 6.4 runs, so his small sample size in the majors where his framing cost the Giants 1.8 runs should be taken lightly. While Susac’s star is waning, Brown’s solid start has his waxing. Susac started the season at triple-A and Brown has managed three home runs and a .258/.343/.581 slash line, but has only caught two of the eleven runners who have attempted steals off of him to date. While it is still a small sample size, if Brown continues to allow steals at that rate, then Susac will likely earn his job back as Brown’s bat begins to cool – which it will.
    If first baseman Brandon Belt is healthy and plays well again like the Giants always thought he would, it will be tempting to leave him at first and catch Posey more in spite of the success they’ve had by moving the catcher to first about a third of the time. It must be incredibly hard to rest a future Hall of Fame player who is also your best player. In that sense Andrew Susac and Trevor Brown are very important men to the Giants because they make sure it doesn’t hurt too much when Posey rests. Giants fans, wrap Susac and Brown in bubble wrap when you see them on BART and enjoy the prime of your Hall of Fame catcher while you still can.

From the NY Gothams to the San Francisco Giants – is this the best run ever for the Bay Area boys?

San Francisco Giants  – A True Dynasty In The Making?
by Jim Silva

    Ten World Series victories, if you include the two they won before it was considered the World Series, eight if you don’t – that’s what the Giants franchise has managed since they got their start in 1883 as the Gothams. That puts them within spitting distance of the second place Cardinals franchise who have won 11 (12 including a pre-1903 victory), tied with the Red Sox, and one behind the A’s of Philadelphia, Kansas City, and Oakland. Nobody is going to catch the Yankees for a long, long, LONG time as they have 27. The recent run of Giants even-season victories – three so far – has brought the dynasty conversation to Giants fans’ lips. Three World Series victories in five seasons is unusual, if not quite rare in World Series history, which begs the question even if the fans don’t – are the current San Francisco Giants a dynasty? The last team to win three World Series in five seasons, before the Giants pulled it off for the first time in their history, was (yawn) the Yankees when they won four in five years (1996-2000). Aside from the Yankees, the A’s are the only team to have done it more than once, winning the Series thrice between 1910 and 1913, and three years in a row from 1972 to 1974. Here is a link to the complete list in case you can’t sleep until you know who won the 1923 World Series.
    Aside from the Yankees, the Red Sox are the only team to really mess up the neat little paradigm of three victories in five seasons by besting that. They won four between 1912 and 1918 which really makes two runs of three if you choose to count victories in both sequences. The Yankees have messed things up three times, winning seven World Series between 1932 and 1943, 10 between 1947 and 1962, and four between 1996 and 2000. No wonder so many reasonable people hate their guts!
    So, most people would assume that this is the closest thing to a dynasty that the Giants franchise has ever mustered. Certainly, if we measure it with World Series victories then that is true. No other team in Giants’ history has three World Series victories in five seasons. But let’s look at this another way. Let’s look at winning percentage as a marker of how good the franchise has been over any particular stretch of time.
    The current iteration of the Giants started winning more games than they lost in 2009, the season before they started their World Series even years hopscotch run. Uh oh – table time! (Note that if a team made it to the playoffs but not the Series then they are in green, while World Series losers are in blue, and World Series victors are in red – as in red hot!)
Season
Winning Percentage
2009
0.543
2010
0.568
2011
0.531
2012
0.580
2013
0.469
2014
0.543
2015
0.519
2009-2015 (7 seasons)
Average Winning Percentage 0.536

Not bad but nowhere near their best stretch in terms of length or winning percentage. Obviously great in terms of post-season performance with three appearances all ending in a World Series victory.

Here is a nice little Giants team, led by Barry Bonds.
Season
Winning Percentage
1997
0.556
1998
0.546
1999
0.531
2000
0.599
2001
0.556
2002
0.590
2003
0.621
2004
0.562
1997-2004 (8 seasons)
Average Winning Percentage 0.570

Really great eight year run with no World Series victories but one appearance, plus three losses in the playoffs.

And then there is this club with Mays, Marichal, and McCovey for much of the run.
Season
Winning Percentage
1961
0.552
1962
0.624
1963
0.543
1964
0.556
1965
0.586
1966
0.578
1967
0.562
1968
0.543
1969
0.556
1970
0.531
1971
0.556
1961-1971 (11 seasons)
Average Winning Percentage .562

Again, a much better run in terms of duration and winning percentage, but only two post-season appearances including one World Series loss.

And oh, by the way, remember – the Giants also played in a small town called New York. These teams were John McGraw’s teams led by “Big Six”, Christy Mathewson. (Here is a link to Mathewson’s fascinating, if somewhat tragic, bio in the SABR Bio Project written by Eddie Frierson)
Season
Winning Percentage
1903
0.604
1904
0.693
1905
0.686
1906
0.632
1907
0.536
1908
0.636
1909
0.601
1910
0.591
1911
0.647
1912
0.682
1913
0.664
1903-1913 (11 seasons)
Average Winning Percentage .634

An amazing stretch, where translated to a 162 game season, they averaged 102 wins a season for 11 seasons! With four World Series appearances but only one win, they still don’t match up with the modern day Giants in terms of the post-season. 1904 is in blue because the Giants won the National League title but refused to play the American League champs, characterizing the upstart league as beneath them.

This last stretch could be broken up differently, but that’s true of all of the groupings. It is arranged this way because it is bookended by World Series appearances. It takes the Giants from Christy Mathewson to Frankie Frisch and Travis Jackson and the beginning of Bill Terry’s career, and it overlaps by three seasons with the 1903 to 1913 run so instead of turning it into one huge run, they intersect somewhat.
Season
Winning Percentage
1911
0.647
1912
0.682
1913
0.664
1914
0.545
1915
0.454
1916
0.566
1917
0.636
1918
0.573
1919
0.621
1920
0.558
1921
0.614
1922
0.604
1923
0.621
1924
0.608
1911-1924 (14 seasons)
0.600

These teams managed eight World Series appearances, although only two wins. They lost a game seven to the Senators in 1924 when Muddy Ruel scored on a walk-off, bad-hop single over Freddie Lindstrom in the bottom of the twelfth!

    It’s hard to talk about dynasties when you have to hold up your club to any of the great Yankees’ runs. The Giants are a tremendous franchise with many stretches that could argue for the dynasty label. Had some of the early Giants’ teams been in the current division system with a Wild Card, they likely would have easily bested the three World Series victories in five seasons. Remember that until 1969 there were no divisions or playoffs. The team with the best record in the NL faced the team with the best record in the AL. And it wasn’t until 1994 that the Wild Card was instituted with the team with the best record among the second place finishers in each league playing against the team with the best record in the first round of the playoffs. Then in 2012 a second Wild Card team was added with a one game playoff to see which team would become the fourth team in the first round of each league’s playoffs. If not for the Wild Card, the Giants wouldn’t even have made it to the playoffs in 2014 because they finished second to the Dodgers by six games. In the old, one-team system they would have finished tied for fourth in the NL, missing the post-season by eight games with the Nationals going to the World Series. The 2012 team which won the NL West would have placed tied for third with the Braves four games back – again staring up at the Nationals. The 2010 team? They would have placed second, this time finishing five in back of the Phillies and watching the series against Tampa Bay on television. The ’97 to 2004 teams would have only made it to the series in 2000 although in a heart-breaker the 100 win 2003 team would have missed by one game as the Braves won 101 that season.
    So what if we break up teams into divisions all the way back to the beginning? How would that have changed the fortunes of some of those older Giants teams? There weren’t as many teams back then in the good old pre-expansion days, but we can at least split them the way it was done in 1969 into the East and West divisions. The ’62 to 1971 Giants in the NL West that includes the Dodgers, Astros/Colt 45’s, Braves, and Reds would actually make the playoffs four times instead of two. The ’71 Giants fell to the “one team only” rule I applied to the rest of the post divisional teams, but the pre-1969 teams benefitted from a conversion to a divisional format.
    The New York Giants of 1903 to 1913 would likely be in the East with the Dodgers of Brooklyn, Phillies of Philadelphia, and Braves of Boston. The Cardinals were the furthest east of the rest, so the “West” would be Chicago, Cincy, St. Louis, and the Pirates. Amazingly, the New York Giants would win their division every year except for the 1907 season. So instead of four post-season appearances they would at least make the playoffs 10 times in 11 seasons! That is dominance albeit in a division with only four teams.
    As for the 1911 to 1924 Giants, they would make the post-season 10 times instead of eight – again, that is incredible dominance. It isn’t a big difference from what they did anyway and they were certainly considered one of the greatest teams in baseball at the time. They were favorites in more than one of those World Series matches that they ended up losing.
    Time makes us forget things – even baseball fans forget. God knows I’d like to forget Gibby taking Eck out on a backdoor slider, or Jeter and that damned flip play (why didn’t Jeremy Giambi slide?) – but sadly those plays are forever emblazoned on my amygdala like other traumas. For many Giants fans, their recent success certainly represents the best Giants teams of their lives and by today’s standards measures up as a dynasty with the ’96 to 2000 Yankees. While it is much easier to get to the post-season nowadays, it is considerably harder to win the World Series once you get there. Look at the 2014 champs who had to win a one game playoff followed by three more series comprising 16 more games before they could call themselves the best in the world. A run like that involves some good luck to be sure – getting hot at the right time – and luck that comes from already having assembled an excellent team. But Buster Posey’s Giants aren’t even close to the top three Giants dynasties in their history and that is something to be proud of if you’re a fan who wears the black cap with the orange “SF” on the brim.
   

Did the Diamonbacks successfully position themselves for a penant run and possibly more?

Robbing Peter to Pay Paul (Goldschmidt)?
by Jim Silva

    Last season’s team was the youngest group the Diamondbacks had ever sent out to do battle in their 19 seasons of existence. Historically, (a funny term to use for an organization that is one of the two newest in baseball) the Diamondbacks have won with older players. They won their only World Series in 2001 with their oldest group of position players and their 3rd oldest group of pitchers. In 2002, their pitching was even older and they went to the playoffs again. So what does it mean that the Diamondbacks are now the youngest team in baseball? Age doesn’t necessarily decide who will win the World Series, but having a young star in his prime can push general managers to make decisions about trades and free agent signings. Also, when you look at a team’s age and how long players are under team control you can see when a good time to go all in might be. The Diamondbacks’ general manager, Dave Stewart, made moves this offseason that are consistent with a team who thinks they are primed to win and are in the window where they have to make moves to solidify their chances to make the post-season.
    Arizona’s middle infield is still trying to find itself. Nick Ahmed is 25, Chris Owings is 23, Brandon Drury is 22, and Jean Segura is 25. They all still have some development in them. That doesn’t mean that all of them will improve enough as hitters to contribute to the offense; that depends on their abilities, their hitting coaches, and their work ethic. 2016 is an important season for the team so at some point they need to make some decisions about whom they are going to focus on as their starters, pick a utility man, and trade someone. Nick Ahmed seemed to be the likely candidate to be moved as Arizona traded for Segura to replace him as the starter, but the Diamondbacks have moved Segura to second, kept Ahmed at short, and pushed Owings to center to take the place of injured star A.J. Pollock.
    Speaking of center field, it was locked down, with 28 year old A.J. Pollock set to be the starter until he broke his elbow at the very end of spring training. Socrates Brito is likely to be his replacement for some, if not most, of the season, although they are currently using Chris Owings in center and have sent Brito down to triple-A. David Peralta, also 28, will man one of the corners with the other corner likely going to Yasmany Tomas who is 24. Pollock and Peralta are likely what you’ve already seen for the most part with Peralta’s counting stats due to increase with regular playing time. Tomas is the youngster of the group and could make gains this season if he is indeed the starting left fielder. It’s a pretty young crew again, so some growth is still possible.
    The rotation of Greinke (32), Miller (25), Corbin (26), Ray (24), and De La Rosa (27) is also young, and has room for growth, with the exception of Greinke. The pen mainstays of Ziegler (36), Hudson (28), Chafin (25), Collmenter (30), Clippard (31), Delgado (26), and Burgos (25) are on average the old men of the Diamondbacks. There are a few young arms in there, but the high leverage situations will likely fall upon the older guys for the most part. Why this obsession with age? For a couple reasons. The Diamondbacks decided to make a push to win this year. Their signing of Greinke, and their trade for Miller constitute significant expenditures of resources. The reality for most teams in baseball is that there are windows during which they can compete and when one of those windows opens you have to make the most of it. That is especially true for the teams not categorized as large market teams. The Diamondbacks decided that they would be primed to compete now if they could add a couple pieces to the rotation. This raises two questions. Do they have enough to compete now, and did they mortgage their future to win now? Let’s look at the second question first.
    The Diamondbacks gave up three good, young pieces to get Miller. Only one of the players had major league experience – the outfielder, Ender Inciarte. Of the two minor leaguers, one was close – the pitcher, Aaron Blair – while the other has just started his minor league career – the shortstop, Dansby Swanson. Blair might have been ready at some point this season since he pitched 13 times in triple-A. Swanson is probably a few years away, although who knows since he was the very first pick in the draft last year. Obviously Inciarte will have an impact in 2016 and for years beyond this as he is 25 and doesn’t get to taste free agency until 2021. To further examine the question about the D-backs future, let’s take a look at the core of the Diamondbacks team that will earn most of the playing time in 2016.
    Data shows that pitchers and position players hit their peak around age 26 and exit their peak around 28 but start declining sharply around age 30. Here is a detailed article from the Boston Globe’s Alex Speier about prime years for baseball players.
So age 27  tends to be around the middle of their peak years. Obviously it is different for everyone, but as a guideline for where a player is in his career I used it as a marker, with the year before and after likely making up a player’s plateau years. If a player is currently in his peak I used a red font. If they have yet to reach their peak, then they are in green, while players in decline years are in black (you know – like death). The first free agency year was included to show how long each player is under team control.

2016 Diamondbacks Key Players Proximity To Their Prime and To Free Agency
Name
Age
First Free Agency Year
Paul Goldschmidt
28
2019
Jake Lamb
25
2021
Jean Segura
25
2019
Welington Castillo
28
2018
Chris Owings
24
2020
Phil Gosselin
27
2021
Brandon Drury
23
2022
Pete O’Brien
25
2022
David Peralta
28
2021
A.J. Pollock
28
2019
Yasmany Tomas
25
2021
Socrates Brito
23
2022
Zack Greinke
32
2022
Patrick Corbin
26
2019
Shelby Miller
25
2019
Robbie Ray
24
2021
Rubby De La Rosa
27
2019
Brad Ziegler
36
2017
Andrew Chafin
25
2021
Enrique Burgos
25
2022
Tyler Clippard
31
2018
Daniel Hudson
28
2017

As you can see, not much black and more green than red indicating that most of the Diamondbacks players are likely to improve. Furthermore, much of the core of the team is under team control for the next three to five years which means that while they shipped away three good young players in a trade that they probably lost by a fair amount, they did not mortgage their future. They should be able to compete for the next several years if they did their job and identified the right players to ride for the next half decade. They gambled that now is their time and that they were one starting pitcher (after Greinke) away from catching the Dodgers and Giants. Whether they win or lose that gamble will likely determine whether Dave Stewart is seen as the architect of another winning team for Arizona, or a goat who gets fired for overpaying for a rotation that didn’t get the job done. Either way, the Diamondbacks are likely to be relevant for the next three to five seasons even if they stand pat.
    There has been discussion during the off-season about the Diamondbacks going for it because Paul Goldschmidt is in his prime. If you look at the chart above you will notice that most of the core of the Diamondbacks club is signed, or at least under team control through 2019 or beyond. Goldschmidt and Pollock can be Diamondbacks through 2019 if the team so desires. That means that if they have what they think they have with their improved rotation and the development of their young position players and the young pitchers they already had, then their window to compete will be more than one season. Obviously the roster won’t stay exactly the way it is today, but the goal for every team is to build a solid core, develop a strong farm system that can continuously feed the major league club and/or can be used to trade for a missing piece, and sign a free agent or two to fill in the other holes. In the case of the Diamondbacks, they developed the back end of their rotation and a strong outfield, as well as the corners of their infield. The middle of the infield was built with youngsters who are good glove men with some offensive potential. The pen was built with some trades to supplement young arms that came up through the farm system. They have built a competitive team and gave up some important pieces of their farm system to make them contenders now. There is always risk in that. Keith Law currently ranks their system 24th out of 30. But they didn’t just position themselves for this year. So to answer the first question (finally) even though they are probably going to end up losing the trade in terms of career WAR by something like two or three to one (or more if Swanson becomes a superstar) they have set themselves up to compete for at least the next three seasons, and in these days of free agency that’s all you can hope for.

A look at the changes to the Padres oufield for 2016.

How About Some Offense AND Defense Please?
By Hugh Rothman
No team, it seems, is affected more by its outfielders than the San Diego Padres. In 2014, as I have stated several times before, the Padres offense was historically awful. And while the infield was pretty dreadful, it was the 2014 Padres outfield that truly dragged the team’s offense down to history making levels. In 2015, the Padres sported a completely revamped outfield which was a breath of fresh air to their fans who had suffered through the nightmares of far too many Will Venable at-bats. The 2015 Padres outfield was far more productive offensively. However, on the surface, the idea of having Justin Upton, Wil Myers, and Matt Kemp roaming the spacious fields of Petco Park seemed like a scary defensive experiment. It turns out that the results of said experiment were far scarier than anticipated.
A Brief Mention of 2014 – Or Seth Smith, We Turn Our Lonely Eyes to You
Seth Smith put up a .266/.367/.440 slash line for the 2014 Padres in 521 plate appearances, finishing second on the team with 12 homers. That’s not exactly star quality production, but it ain’t bad. Of course, it absolutely outpaces every other player who attempted to play outfield for the Padres in 2014. Are you ready for some ugly numbers? Hold on tight:
Name
Plate Appearances
Average
On-Base %
Slugging %
Will Venable
488
.224
.288
.325
Cameron Maybin
272
.235
.290
.331
Alexi Amarista
466
.239
.286.
.314
Chris Denorfia
248
.242
.293
.319
Tommy Medica
240
.233
.286
.408
Carlos Quentin
155
.177
.284
.315
Rymer Liriano
121
.220
.289
.266
Jake Goebbert
115
.218
.313
.317
Abraham Almonte
107
.265
.305
.378
  • Note: Amarista played in the infield as well. He had 197 plate appearances as an outfielder.
Wasn’t that fun?!? There’s more! Xavier Nady, of all people, rose from the dead and contributed a groovy .135/.238/.405 slash line with his 42 plate appearances before sinking back into the stinking, gurgling abyss where all zombies come from. I was personally surprised to see that even Jeff Francoeur, who is apparently on a whirlwind tour to ruin the offenses of every team in baseball, managed to sneak in 28 plate appearances. Naturally, Francoeur had to outdo all of these other outfielders by putting up a tasty .083/.179/.083 slash line that is beyond the pale in pure suckitude.
In short, this was an absolute embarrassment. Clearly, big changes had to be made.
2015 – I Got it! No, You Got it!
A.J. Preller immediately got to work and acquired Kemp, Myers, and Upton to play the outfield, relegating all other pretenders to the bench, or to triple-A, or to… somewhere (anywhere!) else. Alas, one of the victims of the purge was the venerable Seth Smith, but he did fetch a decent bullpen piece. Upton and Kemp had certainly shown they could hit and hit well in the past. Myers too, in his rookie season, had a very impressive campaign. So what happened?
Matt Kemp had a nightmarish start to the season. He didn’t hit his second homer until June. Eventually, he heated up in the second half to finish with a sort of respectable-ish .263/.312/.443 slash line, with a nice even 100 RBIs to boot. Offensively, this was not a disaster. Justin Upton had a different year. He started off reasonably hot, cooled off, got hot again, cooled off, and eventually finished with a .251/.336/.454 slash line. Again, very respectable, considering what the Padres had experienced in the prior year. Wil Myers hit .253/.336/.427 when he was healthy, which, alas, was not very often. Saving the day for the Padres when Myers was tending to his ouchies, was none other than Justin Upton’s brother Melvin, who returned from two disastrous seasons in Atlanta to actually contribute something to a team! His .257/.329/427 slash line as a center fielder was quite welcome, for the first time in 3 years.
However, there is another aspect to the game of baseball: defense. This is where there were significant problems. Let’s start with the good news: The Upton brothers were both ok with the glove. Their DRS numbers (defensive runs saved) were slightly above average. Their defensive WAR numbers were both above replacement level, although not by much. Unfortunately, Justin, the brother who can thump, left for greener pastures this year, but Melvin, the brother who might yet have something left to contribute, is still around to play left field.
Center field was manned by Wil Myers, at least, when the season began. Myers, who had only briefly played center in the minors, was on board with the move, reportedly working on angles and reads during the offseason and in spring training. Since Myers was the youngest and fastest of the three starting outfielders, and besides, the Padres didn’t have anyone else, it made sense to stick Myers in center and watch him prosper. The Padres were sort of following the Ferengi philosophy (the pure capitalists on Star Trek, Next Generation): Step 1: Acquire a youthful player, Step 2: Put him in center field, Step 3: Profit! It didn’t work out very well. First of all, Myers, for all of his preparation, still stank as a center fielder. The numbers aren’t pretty: He was on pace to have a DRS of -20 for the year. That would rank among the lowest numbers in baseball. His defensive WAR was -0.8. That’s pretty hard to do, especially considering that Myers hurt his wrist, was out for a month, came back for 3 days, and then was out for 10 weeks recovering from surgery on that very same wrist. There is no truth to the rumor that the Padres pitching staff were the ones who applied a Billy club whack to Myer’s wrist in the middle of the night, but it wouldn’t be shocking if those rumors were true! Eventually, he came back, but by then, thankfully, Melvin Upton had supplanted him in center. The Myers center field experiment was an abject failure because 1). He can’t play center field very well, and 2). He is too fragile to play there anyway. Myers moving to 1B in 2016 is a sensible move for everyone involved.
How about right field? That was manned by Matt Kemp, who used to be such a good fielder that he played center field back in the day. That was before his arthritic hips starting acting up. Nowadays, Kemp is not a reasonable candidate to play center field anymore. Unfortunately, his days in right field may be numbered as well because in a word, he is a disaster out there. Kemp had an offensive WAR of 2.2, which isn’t bad. Unfortunately, his defensive WAR was an incredible -2.4, which actually made Kemp a below replacement level player in 2015! His DRS was -15. His .972 fielding percentage was worst on the team. Sometimes numbers lie, and maybe Kemp really isn’t this bad. But no, not this time. He really is this bad. Unfortunately, the Padres have an obligation to pay Kemp a premium salary for the next 4 years. The ending could get ugly.
The result of the below-average outfield play from Myers and especially Kemp no doubt contributed to the decline of the pitching numbers. Even the average defense from the Upton brothers didn’t help the pitchers that much (but at least they didn’t hurt them). Will Venable and Cameron Maybin proved they are below average hitters, especially in 2014, but at least those two can play some serious defense. The 2015 Padres outfield had at best average defense from some of their outfielders, and well-below average defense from the rest. The venerable Bill James himself was quoted as saying that much of pitching is in fact, defense! How much did the pitching suffer due to sub-par defense in 2015? Using DRS, the Padres saved a total of 8 runs from their outfield defense in 2014, but gave up a total of 31 runs from their outfield defense in 2015. Thirty-nine runs, just from defense in the outfield, is a pretty big swing and undoubtedly hurt the pitching staff big time in 2015.
2016 – How About Both Offense AND Defense This Time?
Perhaps the Padres learned some valuable lessons over the last two years. You see… outfielders have to play offense AND defense. Anyway, Justin Upton predictably accepted a multi-year contract of many millions to ply his trade in Detroit. Yonder Alonzo was jettisoned to Oakland, making room for Wil Myers to play 1B. Melvin Upton was still around, and his promising half-season was enough to convince the Padres brass that he still could contribute. Albatross Matt Kemp is still around. At least one more outfielder was needed. Seth Smith, sadly, was not available. Instead, the Padres traded for the former Cardinals centerfielder Jon Jay.
Jon Jay was a typical Cardinal: he wasn’t a high draft pick, he didn’t have particularly outstanding tools, he wasn’t a power hitter. Yet, at every level, all he did was hit, including in the majors. His career batting average is .287 and he enjoyed success in every year of his career, except for last season, which was quite terrible. Various injuries were to blame, including wrist problems, which concerned the Cardinals enough to consider trading him. The Padres, who were all too happy to rid themselves of Jedd Gyorko and his ridiculous contract, took the plunge. If Jay is back to full health, there is no reason to think he can’t be the leadoff hitter the Padres have pined for since the days of Bip Roberts, at least for a couple more years. Jay is just the sort of player that may be perfect for Petco Park. He can hit for average, doesn’t have much power, and can play a solid center field. A pretty good pick up for the Padres… if he is fully healthy.
Matt Kemp is Matt Kemp. He is one year older, his hips are not getting any better, and his best position nowadays might be designated hitter. But alas, the Padres have no choice but to pay him, play him, and hope for the best. I repeat: this won’t end well.
Melvin Upton is… well, who knows what he is. He could be the exciting player who looked crazy good with the Tampa Rays. Or, he could be the rotting corpse that played for the Braves the last couple years. My guess is that it is something in between, that at the very least, Melvin Upton is once again able to contribute enough to help a team. The Padres will welcome anything they can get from Melvin considering they have to pay him a princely sum as well.
Backing up these guys are a couple youngsters: Travis Jankowski and Jabari Bash… er Blash. Jankowski is a speedster with little power and Blash is a monster power hitter with no plate discipline to speak of. It makes sense for the Padres to have both of these players on the bench with the hope that one, if not both of them will break out. It won’t happen. Jankowski doesn’t hit well enough to make up for his lack of power and Blash doesn’t recognize a ball from a strike most of the time. Jankowski is 25 and Blash is 26 so this is who they are, for the most part. The Padres could (and have) done worse for backups. Rymer Liriano, at least, is thankfully no longer in the picture, nor is Jake Goebbels, whoever he is (see that 2014 chart above!).
This is not a championship outfield. The Padres have a decent center fielder in Jay, an ok left fielder (at best) in Upton, and an above-average offensive but below-average defensive right fielder in Kemp. It is unlikely that the Padres will suffer 2016 with a historically bad offensive outfield like they did in 2014, or a significantly below-average defensive outfield in 2015, but being “average” or more likely, a bit below-average overall, is not enough to push a team to a championship.

Do the Diamondbacks have enough in the pen to support their expensive rotation?

Submarines in The Desert
By Jim Silva

    If you’ve ever played whiffle ball – real whiffle ball, with the ball that has holes on only one hemisphere –  against someone who was actually trying to beat you, then you have probably faced someone who throws similarly to how the Diamondbacks closer, Brad Ziegler, throws. Ziegler isn’t the first major league pitcher to drop down below his waist to throw, but he is one of the most successful submariners currently pitching in the majors. It’s hard to imagine what a slider looks like coming from Ziegler, but he throws one, along with a sinker and a change. Most closers step to the mound and try to blow you away, not entice you to beat the ball into the dirt, but Ziegler got batters to ground out 74% of the time last year and only struck out 4.8 batters per nine. It is hard to know how to look at peripherals from a pitcher like Ziegler since his game plan is to get the batter to hit the ball, but hit it weakly and at someone’s ankles. Do we care how many guys he fans? Not really. His 2.2 walks per nine is awfully pretty though – that we care about – and his 2-to-1 strikeout to walk ratio is acceptable as well. So when we talk about peripherals from submarine pitchers, perhaps we should look at ground ball rates, walk rates, and home run rates to make predictions. Ziegler allowed 3 home runs in his 68 innings of work which perfectly matches his career rate of 0.4 home runs per nine innings of work. So is it of concern that in Ziegler’s best year in the majors his strikeout rate per nine fell well below his career rate  of 5.9 per nine? When a pitcher has a year like Ziegler did it is important to look at how he did it, but his numbers, aside from an absurdly low .220 BABIP (batting on balls in play), were in line with his career numbers. The super low BABIP is of some concern, but if it rebounds to his career rate of .277, and he continues to limit balls leaving the park, then his filthy, grounder-inducing junk will continue to be effective and he could once again post a wicked DRA (a different measure of ERA that attempts to measure how many runs the pitcher really was responsible for) in the range of 2.27 like he did in 2015.
    Ziegler has most often been a setup guy because a pitcher who induces ground balls is exactly what you want when you have runners on base in double play position. Closers in today’s model usually enter the game with nobody on. It is likely that he will be the closer again after his excellent 2015 in the role. So who will be the setup man in 2016? Last year it was Daniel Hudson after Ziegler moved to the closer role. The late signing of Tyler Clippard gives Arizona some versatility and bullpen depth that will help them during the playoffs if they can manage to get there. It seems that every team is trying to shorten the game – employing multiple shutdown relievers so that if they have a lead going into the 6th the other team is doomed. The Diamondbacks aren’t being like all the other kids because Clippard and Ziegler aren’t flame throwing monsters. Clippard can turn it up to 92 or 93 and Ziegler tops out in the mid-80’s.
    To look at the rest of the Diamondbacks pen, let’s look at a fairly new statistic developed by the fine folks at Baseball Prospectus (BP). DRA (Deserved Runs Allowed) is a stat that would take the place of ERA in evaluating how effective a pitcher was. Whereas ERA is pretty simple (earned runs divided by innings pitched over nine), DRA is more fair and complicated as hell! It takes everything into account when deciding how many runs the pitcher is truly responsible for including unearned runs, the park, the situation he inherited when he entered the game, and more. BP also uses DRA to calculate WARP – the number of wins a pitcher is responsible for above what a replacement level pitcher would have given up – so we will use that when we look at the pitching staff in Arizona.
    If we look at Tyler Clippard, he had a DRA of 3.45 for 2015 in his two stops. His walks were up a bit over his career average – 3.9 walks per nine last season, with a career average of 3.7 walks per nine. He kept his hit rate per nine down at 6.2, just a tick over his career rate of 6.1 per nine. Basically, most of his numbers were consistent with what he had done in recent years except his strikeout rate. Historically Clippard had whiffed at least 10 batters per nine innings. In 2015 he only fanned 8.1 per nine. Last season dragged his career rate down to 9.8 strikeouts per nine. It is possible that the substantial drop in k’s portends a decline from the goggled reliever as his ground ball rate also dropped, but we will see what this season brings, pitching in the desert. He is only 31 and 2015 wasn’t a bad season, so if he bounces back he will likely get a chance to pitch the 8th and maybe even the 9th for Arizona.
    Andrew Chafin allowed a sterling 2.72 DRA in 2015. “Big Country” threw 75 innings in his 66 appearances with righties doing a bit better than lefties – a slash line of .225/.306/.325 versus righties and .182/.260/.264 versus lefties. With splits like that, it is no wonder the Diamondbacks used him for more than an inning at a time. Chafin is a fastball/slider two pitch guy who was mostly a starter in the minors. Since he can go more than an inning, he will likely be used that way. Why pull him when he can get lefties and righties out and save your bullpen? That probably makes him more valuable as the guy who can come in with a man on in the 6th, invite the hitter to ground into a double play – he had a 60% ground ball rate – and stay to pitch the 7th, handing the ball to the setup guy. Chafin doesn’t have the scary strikeout rates of the prototypical closer, but he is a valuable piece of the bullpen with his versatility and his effectiveness.
    Daniel Hudson finally made it back to the majors and survived a full season – his first full season since 2011. He is one of those rare animals with the fortitude to work back from two Tommy John surgeries. The former starter’s fastball played up in relief as he managed an average velocity of just over 96 mph. Hudson was the set-up man, but the last two innings of the game are a little more crowded this year with Tyler Clippard on the squad. Hudson’s DRA was 3.99 and he kept the ball in the park allowing 0.9 homers per nine innings. He gave up 1.32 runners per nine innings mostly based on giving up almost a hit per inning. His control was not as good as it was in his last full season. His walk rate jumped from 2.0 walks per nine innings when he started 33 games in 2011, to 3.3 per nine last season when he pitched in relief 64 times and started once. As a fly ball pitcher in Arizona, he needs to get his WHIP down to get his DRA down and remain stingy with the longballs. With another year away from surgery he could see enough improvement to end up in the closer’s role if either of the two guys ahead of him falters.
    At 25, many of us had no clue what we were doing with our lives. Randall Delgado however was having his second solid season in a row out of the Arizona pen. Here is an example of where ERA and DRA diverge sometimes. Delgado’s ERA in 2014 was 4.87, while his DRA was 3.66. In 2015 his ERA was more in line with his DRA – 3.25 versus 3.69. So if you look at the two seasons next to each other and remove ERA, it looks like the seasons were almost identical. His ERA may have been dramatically influenced by the pitchers around him or just bad luck in 2014. There are a lot of events that are out of the pitcher’s control that can negatively impact his ERA, but DRA takes a more steely-eyed look at everything that goes into runs scoring. In both 2014 and 2015 Delgado fanned at least 9 men per game. He also kept  his home run rate under 1.0 in both seasons, and fashioned hit rates per nine of 8.2 and 7.9 in 2014 and 2015. The knock on Delgado – and remember he is only 25 so there is room for growth – is that he has issued 4.1 free passes per nine innings in each of the last two seasons. If his hit rate goes up, with that walk rate, then he will have a hard time being effective.
    Poor Josh Collmenter. The guy was bounced from the rotation to the pen, back to the rotation and then back to the pen last season. But you can understand the Diamondbacks thinking. Collmenter has been better in relief, at least last season, but he can start and not get completely axe murdered in the role. As a starter, his slash line was .310/.329/.555 with a WHIP of 1.383. When he came out of the pen he allowed a slash line of .229/.284/.365 with a WHIP of 1.108. Guys like Collmenter are really valuable, especially in places like Coors Field or Chase Field where pitchers just don’t fare as well. You need that guy who can be useful out of the pen or jump in when a starter needs a rest or an injury occurs. There were a couple red lights that flashed for Collmenter last season. His strikeouts per nine dropped from 8.3 in 2013, to 5.8 in 2014, and dropped again to 4.7 last season while his home run rate spiked to 1.3 per nine innings last season. Collmenter is unlikely to get many chances to regain a spot in the rotation if his numbers continue those alarming trends.
    Enrique Burgos throws a fastball and a slider, each about half the time last season, and he used that combo to strike out 13.0 batters per nine innings last season in his rookie year. Life was exciting last year when Enrique jogged from the pen. When he wasn’t striking guys out he was allowing 9.0 hits per nine innings, and walking 5.0 per nine. He was perpetually walking the tightrope. The guy throws hard – an average fastball just a hair below 96 MPH, but his control is not major league ready. He sprinted through AA and AAA last season in spite of walk rates above 7.0 per nine, so another year in the minors trying to figure out where the ball is going would do him good. He has been groomed as a future closer and he helped a tiny bit last season in the bigs –  DRA of 4.18 and a WARP of 0.2. If the Diamondbacks want him to be a big league closer someday they need to let him finish cooking in Reno.
    The Diamondbacks are the hip pick to unseat the Dodgers in the West after a big off-season where they rebuilt their rotation and picked up some help for their bullpen. But they play in a pretty harsh park on pitchers (and a great one for hitters!), which means that they might consider handling their pitching staff a little differently than clubs in more neutral or pitcher-friendly parks do. The Diamondbacks finished in the bottom third of the National League in quality starts which means there was a lot of pressure on their pen to pull games out of the fire or even just finish games. They have a much better starting rotation this year, so that should help. But they also have a unique opportunity with two guys who have closed successfully before in Clippard and Ziegler, the incumbent. The Diamondbacks could try a dual closer model where Ziegler pitches more than an inning when he closes or sets up, and Tyler Clippard pitches a more traditional closer’s role but also functions as a traditional one-inning setup man when Ziegler closes. The idea would be to use Ziegler in double play situations, but to use Clippard when there is no one on first. Ziegler isn’t your stereotypical closer so why use him like one? Whether they try it or not, having two closers (and maybe even a third in Daniel Hudson) is a good idea on a team that struggles to get pitchers through the 5th, or just teams that play in a tough park on pitchers.

What impact will the Shelby Miller trade have on the Diamonbacks starting rotation?

Putting Your Chips On Red, 2016
by Jim Silva

    Pitching in Arizona is not fun. It’s probably more fun than pitching in Colorado, but it is clearly challenging. Last season, the Diamondbacks pitchers finished in the bottom half of the majors in earned run average (4.04), WHIP – walks plus hits per innings pitched (1.33), batting average against (.258), and most telling, and likely the reason GM Dave Stewart made some of the moves he made in the off-season, quality starts (25th). It must have been fun to go to D-Backs games because the ball was flying all over the place! Of the six men who started most of the games for Arizona last season, five of them gave up an average of more than a home run per nine innings. Their ace, Rubby De La Rosa gave up 32 long balls all by himself, one dinger away from tying for the league lead. Only two NL teams gave up more home runs than Arizona – The Rockies (of course, I mean they play in Coors Field!), and the Phillies, who were, and still are in a complete rebuild. But even with starting pitching that gave up a lot of home runs and finished 23rd in all of baseball in ERA, the Diamondbacks finished 3rd in the West only two games below .500. In other words, the team had a championship caliber offense, but was undermined by a sub-par pitching staff. It was pretty clear what Dave Stewart needed to do, although how he achieved his goal will likely be talked about for years to come.
    The Diamondbacks made the biggest splash this off-season by signing free agent starting pitcher Zack Greinke, who would have been an ace, except he pitched on the same team as Clayton Kershaw. Greinke was coming off his best season and nobody expected him to sign with Arizona – it looked like a two horse race between the Dodgers and the Giants – but 6 years and $206.5 million got the deal done, making Greinke a Snake. But Stew wasn’t done there. He went out and got another starting pitcher by trading away a package that included the guy they got with the very first pick in last year’s draft, Dansby Swanson, who many think is as “can’t miss” as prospects get.
    Zack Greinke is 31, has a Cy Young Award (2009 with KC), a pair of Gold Glove Awards, three All Star game appearances, and a handful of MVP votes. He also has an impressive .604 career winning percentage bolstered by his 19-3 record last season for the Dodgers when he finished second in the Cy Young voting. The won-lost record last year was amazing, but he did some other things even more amazing in what was probably his best season ever.
    Greinke’s control is excellent. Last season he struck out 200 batters while only walking 40 in nearly 223 innings. Those numbers are in line with Greinke’s career numbers, but his league-leading 0.844 WHIP was his best mark by a good stretch. He also led the league in winning percentage at .864, ERA+ (park adjusted ERA relative to the league) with 225, ERA with a sterling 1.66 mark and possibly, most babies saved from a burning building. While not a league-leading mark, Zack also was stingy with the long ball, allowing only 0.6 home runs per nine innings. That last number will be a welcome sight in Arizona if he can come even close to replicating it. Granted, he amassed that in one of the best pitcher’s parks in baseball. Another category that Mr. Greinke led that makes him a perfect potential savior for the Diamondbacks starting rotation, was quality starts – he made 30 to best even Jake Arrieta (the Cy Young Award winner), who had 29, and pitching god, Clayton Kershaw who made 27. So yes, Zack Greinke is within acceptable parameters as a starting pitcher. If the Diamondbacks have anything that should keep them awake at night, it might be that there is almost no way he can repeat his last season – not just because it was such a great season, but also because his new home park is hard on pitchers. Will fans in Arizona be disappointed if Greinke’s ERA “blows up” into the threes? What if it touches 4.00? Greinke has pitched in a hitter’s park before (Milwaukee in 2011 and 2012) and managed to keep his ERA below 3.00. Regression to the mean, however, is a beast (or something else unpleasant that starts with a ‘b’).
    Shelby Miller has started at least 31 games in each of the last three seasons – led the league with 33 last season – and he is only 25. The D-Backs paid a hefty price to pry him away from the Braves. The obvious question, “Is he worth it?” is already being asked and written about exhaustively. Miller did something last year that he has done in each of his three full seasons in the majors. He kept his hits per nine innings right around 8.0 (7.9, 7.9, and 8.0). This is important because Miller has walked between 3.0 and 3.6 batters per nine innings – 3.2 last season – so he has to limit the number of hits in order maintain a WHIP in the 1.2s. He also took an important step last season that portends well for him in Arizona. The 6’3” righty kept the ball in the park better than in any previous season, limiting hitters to 0.6 home runs over nine innings. In his first two full campaigns, he had allowed 1.0 and 1.1 jacks per nine innings, so if this is real growth, Miller has a chance to succeed in Arizona. If it is an aberration, then his ERA is likely to jump quite a bit in the dry air of Phoenix. One note of caution: his splits are cause for concern as his WHIP and ERA both jumped in the second half. Temper that caution with the knowledge that he threw more innings last year than in any season of his career so maybe he was just tuckered out.
    With a 94 MPH average fastball and a nasty change that he throws about 20% of the time, you would think Rubby De La Rosa would fool more batters than he does, but based on his numbers from last season, which are in line with his career numbers, it’s Rubby who is getting fooled. Starting with his ERA+, which hasn’t bested 100 since his rookie year of 2011, to his home runs per nine innings mark (career: 1.3, 2015: 1.5), there isn’t much, other than durability to recommend him. At some point your “stuff” has to translate into results and that hasn’t happened for the 26 year old Dominican. There were two positive notes for Rubby last year. His WHIP dropped again last year from 1.500 in 2013, to 1.485 in 2014, down to 1.357 in 2015. Still way too many baserunners – especially for someone who gives up 32 home runs – but consistent improvement nonetheless. De La Rosa also saw a slight improvement in his strikeout to walk ratio from 2.11 in 2014 up to 2.38 in 2015, mostly on the back of an increased strikeout rate as his walk rate remain largely unchanged (3.1 per nine in 2014 to 3.0 per nine in 2015). Still, he is far too hittable and gives up way too many baserunners as well as home runs. With the diminished pressure that comes from having more quality starters ahead of you, perhaps De La Rosa can improve enough to make him more than a consumer of innings (188.67 in 2015) for the Diamondbacks, his 14 wins notwithstanding.
    Have you ever wondered what it would be like to have one part of your body replaced with another part of your body? You know, put your left leg where your right arm used to be – that kind of thing? Well, Patrick Corbin is one of the increasing numbers of humans who have done that via Tommy John surgery. The lefty from Clay, New York had his surgery in 2014 and made his mostly triumphant return in July of 2015. This season he will come to spring training after a relatively normal off-season where no doctors tried to swap his right eye for his nose or anything, and more recovery time under his belt. Corbin was looking like an ace in the making before he hurt himself, and his return last summer showed that he could still pitch. Corbin managed 16 starts last season and actually showed some improved numbers, even from his All-Star 2013 season, before his elbow popped. His FIP (ERA independent of fielding) dropped a touch from 3.43 to 3.35. Corbin increased his strikeouts to walk ratio from 3.30 to 4.59 by increasing his strikeout rate by just over a half-k per nine, and dropping his walk rate by a half walk per nine. Two concerns (other than no longer having his actually elbow ligament in his throwing elbow anymore) were a slight bump in his home rate from 0.8 to 1.0 and a substantial jump in his hit rate. He gave up 9.6 hits per nine innings bumping his WHIP from his 1.166 rate in 2013 to 1.271 in 2015. Corbin was more hittable last season as his 2013 rate was 8.2 hits per nine innings. Corbin looked like an ace in the making in 2013 based on his results and his workload. Not many starters notch 200 innings anymore, but Corbin did in 2013. As a 25 year old with Tommy John surgery in his past, it is probably unwise to try to get 200 innings out of him again, at least not right away. Replacing quality with quantity though – now that’s a good trade! If Corbin can stay healthy and put up numbers comparable to what he did last year, then he slots in nicely behind Greinke, either in front of or behind Miller. Corbin’s fastball/slider combo has worked quite well, even in Arizona, so having him back for a full season – even without the addition of Greinke and Miller – makes the Diamondbacks a better team.
    Arizona has a very young team – the youngest in the majors by a year – which should scare the rest of the league. Their likely 5th starter will be 24 year old Robbie Ray. Ray threw his fastball a lot in 2015 – 72% of the time, mixing it with his slider, and change-up. The 6’2” lefty had the lowest ratio of home runs allowed per nine innings of the six most frequently used starters for Arizona in 2015 at 0.6. He also allowed the fewest hits per nine innings at 8.5, and struck out the most batters per nine innings with 8.4, so by some peripherals he was the best starter in the group. Where he fell back to the pack was his control. Ray gave up 3.5 freebies per nine – even worse than De La Rosa, inflating his WHIP to 1.332. The walk rate was below his career rate of 4.0, so Ray improved while making strides elsewhere in his game. He’s tough to hit, and if last season is any indication, he is becoming tough to go deep on. He could very well climb over De La Rosa in the rotation if he can hold onto his gains and take the next step in his growth.
    For a brief, shining moment, it looked like Archie Bradley was going to have a stellar debut fitting of a top prospect. He was making headlines with his excellent start and then made a headline of another sort when he took a line drive to the face off the bat of Carlos Gonzalez of the Rockies. There is a history of pitchers suffering a similar fate who could not get past the terror and get back to pitching fearlessly – understandably so. Bradley is, you know, young –  just 23. The line drive off his face didn’t dramatically change his control as he had just come off a six-inning start where he put five guys on. Also, his minor league career walk rate is 4.7 free passes per nine – untenable. What did change was his hit rate. After giving up only seven hits in his first 18.66 innings, Bradley came back three weeks later and gave up 27 hits in his last 15.67 innings. Small sample size caveats apply to all of these numbers – lots of guys start off hot and then cool down – but he was quite awful after his return, so a wait-and-see approach is advisable when young Archibald next appears on the mound. Keep in mind that our guy has been around the top of the prospect ranks since he was drafted so he will get more chances than you would if you were to walk into a tryout camp in say, Rancho Cucamonga. He is likely to be the first option should one of the top five starters blow up.
    A converted shortstop, Braden Shipley will start his 2016 pitching for the triple-A Reno Aces. After succeeding, for the most part, in his full season at double-A in 2015, the Diamondbacks will be keeping a close eye on Shipley to see if he is ready in case of an injury, or just plain crappiness, in the major league rotation. He has already jumped over Archie Bradley and is now the top ranked prospect for Arizona. Double-A is tough, so a slight increase in his walk rate while keeping his home run rate at 0.4 is good news. The fact that his strikeout rate (6.8 k’s per nine) dropped is something to keep an eye on. It was his first season under 8.0 k’s per nine, and indicates that he wasn’t missing as many bats as he had in the past. Depending on how he handles triple-A batters he is likely to see what Arizona looks like in the summer or at least in the early fall of 2016.
    Increased depth, a better top of the rotation, and two youngsters almost ready to jump the rotation who are working on it at triple-A will push the Diamondbacks toward the top of the NL West this year. They gave up a ton of resources (money and prospects) to pull in an ace and a number two starter who are now locked up for a few years. If Greinke is Greinke and Miller is close to what he looked like last season, the Diamondbacks will be greatly improved in 2016. Will it be enough to best the Dodgers and Giants? I mean all three teams have studs at the top of the rotation. Their fortunes might be decided by the back of the rotation, and of course health. It should be a great race though.

A look at the 2016 Diamonbacks outfield without Ender Inciarte.

Shagging Flies in The Desert
by Jim Silva

    There has been one sheriff in Phoenix for a couple years now, and that has been Paul Goldschmidt. Not that the Diamondbacks didn’t have any other good players, but none of the youngsters had reached star status until last season. A.J. Pollock took his game to another level in 2015 and became the deputy to Goldy’s sheriff. Pollock has been an underrated centerfielder for the last couple of years. In 2015 – his age 27 season – he put it all together saving his team 14 runs according to DRS (defensive runs saved), and putting up a 7.4 WAR season.
    Pollock’s previous two seasons had been good by most measures. In 2013 and 2014 he put together 3.5 and 3.9 WAR seasons respectively, while also saving his team 12 and 8 runs according to DRS. Pollock won a Gold Glove last season and actually deserved it if you believe the defensive numbers. A couple of factors turned him from a good player into a star last season. First of all, A.J. increased his walk rate and decreased his strikeout rate. It wasn’t a huge change, but the 53 walks combined with his .315 average drove his on-base percentage from his previous high of .353 to .367. He spent more time hitting in the two hole, but he also was the leadoff hitter 48 times. That .367 on-base percentage would make him a good candidate to bat first on most teams, but his power and batting average might make him a two or three-hole hitter on a team with so many high on-base percentage candidates. Pollock also showed excellent speed and the ability to steal bases with a high success rate – 39 steals at 85% last season. This represented a big jump for Pollock who had stolen 27 bases in his previous 862 major league plate appearances. A move to the two hole in front of Goldschmidt might decrease Pollock’s stolen base totals, but he will still steal at a high success rate.
    One of the other pieces that came together for Pollock last season was a swap of some doubles for home runs. He reached double digits in home runs, with 20, for the first time in his career. He still swatted 39 doubles and chipped in six triples for 65 extra-base hits on the year. His slugging percentage didn’t change from 2014, staying at exactly .498 again, but it was achieved by a decrease in doubles and an increase in home runs. As Pollock was 27 and experiencing his first full season’s worth of at-bats, it is reasonable to expect  the homer spike to stick around and maybe even increase with experience and health, especially if his walk rate/strikeout rate growth continues. Pollock’s growth is real and should be the new normal for the next few years giving the Diamondbacks two hitting stars who can also pick it with the best of them.
    ESPN reports that David Peralta will move to right field in 2016 to accommodate Yasmany Tomas. Peralta should get close to 600 plate appearances this season after the Diamondbacks dealt away Ender Enciarte. The 2015 version of David Peralta did an excellent job in his 517 plate appearances with a slash line of .312/.371/.522. That’s quite a slash line for his second season in the majors. Peralta showed excellent bat control making contact with 86% of the pitches he swung at that were in the strike zone, where about 80% is average. He also showed good strike zone discipline offering at just under 33% of pitches outside of the strike zone, which was an improvement from 2014, and well below the average, which was approximately 46%. With 53 extra-base hits in 517 plate appearances, he showed excellent power, hitting 26 doubles, 17 home runs, and leading the league with 10 triples. The one area where Peralta showed weakness was against lefties. His slash line against freaks who throw from the wrong side was .250/.311/.375 – pretty anemic. More at-bats against lefties will either drive down his batting average below .300, or he will make adjustments and become even scarier at the plate. Peralta batted in the four hole more often than not in 2015, so there will be many chances to drive in Goldschmidt and Pollock if they bat in the 3rd spot and 2nd spot respectively.
    Peralta’s glove is a little harder to call after two seasons in the majors. Last season, he saved 15 runs with positioning and cutting off extra-base hits but gave them back plus a few with mistakes and poor throws. He is a converted pitcher so you would expect a canon for an arm, so perhaps the issue is with accuracy. His range was above league average at all three outfield spots, so if the throwing issue was a one year aberration, then he should be a plus defender with a power bat in 2016.
    Yasmany Tomas defected from Cuba in 2014 and signed an enormous contract with Arizona – six years for $68.5 million. He is 25 ,and had played for the Cuban national team but didn’t have much minor league experience when the Diamondbacks brought him up to the big league team – 21 at bats at Reno. Perhaps it was the big contract that inspired Arizona to rush him to the majors. Tomas is a big man, and looks like he could crush the ball just by looking at it. Unfortunately that isn’t what happened last season when he was called up.
    His showing in spring training had many believing that he could not hang at third base and his work there in 31 games proved it as he cost his team six runs, according to DRS, and showed below league average range. He also made six errors in his limited time there for a .918 fielding percentage. In an attempt to give his bat a chance to shine without his glove detracting so much, the Diamondbacks shifted him to right field where he cost his team yet another six runs.
    Considering the fact that the Diamondbacks had three excellent outfielders last season (they traded Ender Enciarte during the off-season), a lot of trouble was made to try to keep Tomas on the field, so you would think that he must have raked like a beast. In fact, his slash line was .275/.305/.401 – not exactly raking. With only 31 extra-base hits in 426 plate appearances he didn’t deliver the thump that would have made up for the lack of on-base skills. With 110 strikeouts to go with only 17 walks, he didn’t get to exploit pitchers needing to throw strikes when they got behind. His swing rate was high – he swung at 57% of pitches thrown to him, and his contact rate was low – he put his bat on only 72% of pitches thrown. Subsequently, pitchers threw him strikes only 44.75 percent of the time, which is below average. He makes good contact when he swings at strikes, but flails when he chases pitches out of the strike zone.
    The Diamondbacks are clearly invested in Tomas, so he will have every opportunity to fail or succeed in 2015 as the starting left-fielder. Having Enciarte around to be his caddie next year would have helped, but since that won’t happen he will face all comers and sink or swim on his own. He hits lefties harder but wasn’t hopeless against righties so a platoon isn’t necessary. More disconcerting are his splits – first versus second half of the season. His slash line in the first half was an encouraging .313/.351/.448, but whether pitchers figured him out or something else happened to Tomas, his second half slash line plummeted to .208/.228/.325. Those are reserve middle infielder numbers, not big, lumbering corner outfielder numbers. The Diamondbacks should be scared that their $68 million investment might be a half-season wonder. His 2016 spring training was encouraging, and a hot start will put to rest fears that he can’t adjust to big league pitching. But if he struggles in the first half or has similar second half woes, what is to be done? Arizona has invested a lot of money in the Cuban star and they pushed him directly to the majors with no adjustment time. Should they send him down and work with him on what to do when pitchers discover a weakness? Unless he stops chasing, he will never realize his potential at the plate, and if he doesn’t have that, well, he doesn’t have anything.
    With Ender Enciarte gone, who will play the outfield when the guys mentioned above are at a baby shower or driving their mom up the coast to a wedding? The Diamondbacks are not afraid to push their young prospects fast, so it would not be a surprise to see Socrates Brito make the team out of spring training as the fourth outfielder. Old Socrates has a few things going for him, aside from his cool name, that make him a reasonable pick to be the guy. He is reported to have a good arm and sound glove and his very small sample size in the majors last season support this as he saved the D-Backs three runs (DRS). He also showed tremendous range in right – again small sample size caveats apply here. Brito is clearly fast, as evidenced by his 21 steals in 27 attempts last year, and his 118 career steals. It is not a stretch to envision him playing center to spell Pollock and he can clearly handle either corner. The two big issues with the husband of Xanthippe – oh wait, that’s the other Socrates – is that he doesn’t walk enough, and he doesn’t hit home runs. In defense of the fleet young outfielder, he hits for a high average (.303 in his cup of coffee in the majors to go with a career .288 mark in the minors), and he musters enough doubles and triples to avoid being labeled a slap hitter. Another thing Brito has going for him is that he is the best option. The Diamondbacks system was ranked 24th by Keith Law in his annual prospect rankings, and Socrates Brito was the only D-Back outfielder ranked in the organization’s top 10. There is some risk as Brito jumped from AA to play in 18 major league games last season, so he might be overmatched, although he looked good in his very limited debut.
    It’s hard to get excited about the 5th outfield spot, unless of course you are the one occupying the 5th outfield spot. In the case of the Diamondbacks, one possible winner of the “last spot on the roster” derby could be Peter O’Brien. You can read more about him in the Diamondbacks Catching article entitled, “Beef and Tuffy Catching for The Rattlers?”, but suffice it to say he will spend a lot of time on the bench and get his at-bats as a pinch hitter. O’Brien is a butcher in the field but can “play” left field, first base and possibly stop the ball from skittering to the backstop when the pitcher throws. What O’Brien does that gets him on rosters is hit balls to the moon – a nice skill to have on your bench. If he doesn’t get the bench spot, and instead gets sent to the minors, it will be because the Diamondbacks need someone who can field acceptably, and because Arizona still wants to try to turn O’Brien into a complete player who can field acceptably somewhere.
    The Diamondbacks lack depth in the outfield and have some uncertainty with Tomas. If he fails, then they are into very risky territory with a talented, but raw youngster just up from AA in Brito, or a powerful free-swinging statue in O’Brien. But Pollock and Peralta give them a solid to spectacular profile in center and right, and if Tomas pans out to be at least decent, then the Diamondbacks will have one of the better all-around outfields in the West.